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This paper studies a New-Keynesian model in which monetary policy may switch between regimes.
We derive sufficient conditions for indeterminacy that are easy to implement and we show that the
necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy, provided by Davig and Leeper, is necessary but
not sufficient. More importantly, we use a two-regime model to show that indeterminacy in a passive
regime may spill over to an active regime, no matter how active the latter regime is.  As a result, a
passive monetary policy is more damaging than has been previously thought. Our results imply that
the propagation of shocks in an active regime, such as that of the Federal Reserve in the post-1982
period, may be substantially affected by the possibility of a return to a passive regime of the kind that
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I. Introduction
The basic new-Keynesian model (NK) consists of a forward-looking IS curve, an
expectations-augmented Phillips curve and a policy rule, in which the interest rate
responds to current values of in￿ation and output. This model is at the core of a
wide class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models currently in use
for policy analysis in both academia and central banks.
1 A monetary policy rule that
directs the policy-maker to respond to in￿ation by raising the interest rate less than
one-for-one in response to an increase in in￿ation is said to be passive and a rule that
directs the central bank to raise the interest rate more than one-for-one is said to be
active (Leeper, 1991). A central bank that adopts an active rule is said to follow the
Taylor principle after work by John Taylor (1993) who argued that a simple rule of
this kind is a good characterization of actual central bank policy. In the basic NK
model, passive policies lead to the existence of indeterminate equilibria in the sense
that arbitrarily close to one equilibrium there is another one.
It is widely believed that the presence of indeterminacy is undesirable not only
because it permits the existence of non-fundamental shocks but also because it ampli-
￿es the persistence and volatility of the equilibrium paths of in￿ation, interest rates,
and output in response to fundamental shocks.
2 Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2000),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) estimate central bank
policy rules for the U.S. economy for the period from 1960 through 1996. Their es-
timates show that macroeconomic volatility has been much lower in the post-1982
period than in the pre-1980 period and they attribute this reduction in volatility to
the switch from a passive monetary policy, that implies indeterminacy, to an active
policy that implements the unique equilibrium.
Motivated by this empirical work, Davig and Leeper (2005, 2006b, DL) extend the
basic NK model by removing the assumption that a policy rule must be ￿xed forever.
They study two policy regimes, one active in which policy is chosen by an in￿ation
hawk and the other passive in which it is chosen by an in￿ation dove. DL allow
the coe￿cients of the Taylor rule to vary stochastically across regimes according to
a Markov-switching process and, within this Markov-switching NK model (MSNK),
they assume that the in￿ation dove chooses a policy that would lead to indeterminacy
if the economy were to remain forever in the passive regime and the in￿ation hawk
chooses a policy that would lead to determinacy under a permanently active regime.
3
1King (2000) and Woodford (2003) provide good introductions to the basic three-equation new-
Keynesian model.
2For a more detailed exposition of this argument see Woodford (2003, page 88).
3Economic arguments for modelling policy changes in a probabilistic manner were ￿rst put forth
by Sims (1982) and by Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984). These authors argued that once a policy
regime has changed, the rational public will expect such shifts to occur again in the future and willMARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 3
DL provide a necessary and su￿cient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium of the
MSNK model and they show that, for this model, the parameter region of determinate
equilibria may be considerably larger than the union of the determinacy regions of
the two separate NK models where agents do not take account of the probability of
future regime change. In the MSNK model, if the passive regime is relatively short-
lived and/or if the in￿ation hawk follows a su￿ciently active policy, expectations
about future regime change may induce the passive regime to become determinate.
This e￿ect, referred to by DL as a cross-regime spillover, occurs because rational
agents take account of the probability of future regime change when forming their
expectations.
Throughout the paper we maintain the same assumptions as DL. Speci￿cally, we
assume Ricardian ￿scal policy and consider only bounded equilibria. Even with these
quali￿cations, the MSNK model is di￿erent from the basic NK model in important
ways since its determinacy and indeterminacy properties depend not only on parame-
ters that describe how policy makers act in any given regime, but also on parameters
that describe the probabilities of regime change. We would like to explain the equi-
librium characteristics in terms of these underlying parameters and, in this paper, we
make four signi￿cant contributions to this goal.
First, we derive a wide class of su￿cient conditions for indeterminacy of the MSNK
model that are straightforward to check in practice and that could potentially be used
to assist a central banker to form policies that eliminate expectations-driven equilib-
ria. Second, we prove that Davig and Leeper’s condition, when used for identifying
indeterminacy, is a special case of our general su￿cient conditions. Moreover, we
show that their condition is necessary but not su￿cient to ensure local uniqueness.
4
Third, we provide a calibrated example of an indeterminate equilibrium in which
passive monetary policy spills over into the active regime and both regimes are inde-
terminate.
5 This example is based on Lubik and Schorfheide’s (2004) estimates and
it is disturbing since it suggests that the U.S. economy may be in, or close to, the
indeterminacy regime in practice. Finally, we show that if the probability of staying
in the passive regime is su￿ciently high or if policy in this regime is su￿ciently pas-
sive, there may be nothing the in￿ation hawk can do to prevent indeterminacy even
in the active regime. This new result implies that the mere existence of a su￿ciently
passive regime makes the e￿ects of an in￿ation dove much more damaging than has
been previously thought.
form a probability distribution over possible regime change. More recently, Leeper and Zha (2003)
have drawn out implications of this way of thinking for practical monetary policy.
4See Gal￿ (2006) for a similar point.
5Previous work by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006a) gives an example where indeterminacy, if
it exists, occurs only in the passive regime.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 4
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the new-
Keynesian model with regime switching. Section III discusses a claim of Davig and
Leeper who provide a necessary and su￿cient condition for the equilibrium of a
model of this type to be unique. We use a calibrated example of the model to
illustrate that their condition produces puzzling results. These results suggest the
DL condition is not su￿cient to rule out (local) nonuniqueness and in Section IV
we substantiate this conjecture by providing a wider class of su￿cient conditions for
indeterminacy that applies to a broader class of Markov switching DSGE models of
which the NK model is a member. In Section V we apply our theorem to a calibrated
model of the U.S. economy using parameter values taken from the empirical work
of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and we show that the equilibrium of the calibrated
model is indeterminate and hence there may be sunspot equilibria in both the passive
and the active regime. Section VI provides more examples in which once again there
is a sunspot equilibrium in both the active and in the passive regime. Most of the
examples illustrate a powerful implication from one of the corollaries of our main
theorem. They di￿er from the example of Section V by demonstrating that if the
in￿ation dove is su￿ciently passive, there may be no feasible action that can be taken
by the in￿ation hawk to restore determinacy of equilibrium. Section VII summarizes
our results and makes some suggestions for extensions.
II. The Model
We consider the new-Keynesian DSGE model estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) and analyzed by Davig and Leeper. This model is described by following
equations,
AS curve ¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ·xt + u
S
t ; (1)
IS curve xt = Etxt+1 ¡ ¾
¡1(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + u
D
t ; (2)
Policy rule it = ®st¼t + °stxt; (3)
where xt is output, ¼t is in￿ation, it is the nominal interest rate, uD
t is an aggregate
demand shock, and uS
t is an aggregate supply shock. Following DL, we measure the
variables ¼t and it as percentage deviations from their steady state values and xt as
the deviation of output from its trend path.
The private sector block, consisting of Equations (1) and (2), has three regime-
independent parameters, ¾, ¯ and ·. The parameter ¾ represents the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, ¯ is the discount factor of the representative household, and
· is the slope of the Phillips curve. Uncertain monetary policy is represented by Eq
(3), the policy rule. This equation has two regime-dependent parameters (®st and
°st) that capture the degree to which monetary policy is active or passive. We follow
DL and assume that st follows an exogenous Markov process with transition matrixMARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 5
P = [pij]. The element pij represents the probability that st = j given st¡1 = i for
i;j 2 f1;:::hg where h is the number of regimes. For all examples considered in
the paper, we focus on h = 2 where monetary policy is active in the ￿rst regime and
passive in the second regime.
To write the new-Keynesian model in a compact form, we substitute Eq (3) into
Eq (2). Rearranging the terms in Eqs (1)￿(2), the model can be written as


























The remainder of the paper is based on this MSNK model and our examples in
Sections V and VI use the model to make a number of points. The su￿ciency theorem
of Section IV is more general and allows for h regimes and n equations in each regime.
III. Some Puzzling Results
A key policy question is: Under what condition is the equilibrium of the MSNK
model (locally) non-unique in the sense that arbitrarily close to it there is another
one? This question is at the heart of our subject because the design of a good policy
depends on it. By avoiding policies that lead to locally non-unique equilibria, a
policy maker may hope to reduce the variance and persistence of output and in￿ation.
Davig and Leeper (2005, 2006b) claim to give an answer to our question by providing
a necessary and su￿cient condition for uniqueness (and hence also for nonuniqueness)
of equilibrium in the MSNK model represented by Eq (4). They refer to this condition
as the ￿Long-Run Taylor Principle￿. In the rest of this section we review the DL claim
and demonstrate that their claim has puzzling implications.6
III.1. The DL necessary and su￿cient condition. The DL approach begins by
expressing the conditional expectations Et¼t+1 and Etxt+1 in Eq (4) as follows7
Et¼t+1 = pst1Et¼1t+1 + pst2Et¼2t+1; (5)
Etxt+1 = pst1Etx1t+1 + pst2Etx2t+1; (6)
6DL’s paper is part of a growing literature on Markov-switching rational expectations models
that includes papers by Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Leeper and Zha (2003), Schorfheide (2005),
Svensson and Williams (2005), Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006b), and Davig and Leeper (2006a).
7For complete details, see Appendix B in Davig and Leeper (2005, 2006b). For an analysis of why
these expressions are problematic, see Appendix A at the end of our paper.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 6
where ¼1t, ¼2t, x1t, and x2t are newly introduced random variables such that ¼it = ¼t
and xit = ¼t when st = i for i = 1;2. Up to this point ¼1t and x1t have not been
de￿ned when st = 2 and ¼2t and x2t have not been de￿ned when st = 1. Nonetheless,
DL substitute Eqs (5) and (6) into the model, Eq (4), and they express each of the
original two equations as a pair of equations in the four endogenous random variables
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Computing a uniqueness condition for this linear rational expectations system is a
standard problem (see, for example, Sims (2002); Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)) and
DL correctly state that a necessary and su￿cient condition for determinacy of the
equilibrium in Eq (7) is that all the generalized eigenvalues of (B;A) lie inside the
unit circle. However, this condition is not the same as ￿nding a unique bounded
equilibrium to the original model represented by Eq (4).8 Using the linear system,
Eq (7), DL make the following claim.
Claim 1. A necessary and su￿cient condition for the MSNK model, Eq (4), to have a
unique bounded equilibrium is that all the generalized eigenvalues of (B;A) lie inside
the unit circle.
Using Claim 1, DL provide various determinacy regions for the MSNK model and
reinterpret Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)’s empirical work in light of these regions.
In Section VI, we will discuss some of their results in more detail.
III.2. An implication of the DL condition. In this subsection we provide an
example of the NK model to illustrate a puzzling implication of the DL claim. Our
example suggests the conjecture that their condition is not su￿cient to ensure unique-
ness of the equilibrium, a conjecture that we prove in Section IV.
8In the special case of the Fisherian model, for which n = 1, the DL condition can be supplemented
by the restriction that the scalar quantities F¡1
st H are non-negative to provide a correct set of
necessary and su￿cient conditions for local uniqueness. This does not imply, even for this special
case, that Eqs (7) and (4) equivalent.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 7
Consider the NK model with the parameter values reported in Table 1. All of these
numbers are within the parameter space considered in the existing literature. They
imply that the ￿rst regime is active and has a unique equilibrium when treated in
isolation and the second regime is passive and indeterminate.
Private Sector Regime 1 Regime 2 Trans Prob
¯ ¾ · ®1 °1 ®2 °2 p22
0.99 2.84 0.3 3.6 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.9
Table 1. Parameter Values for a NK Economy
For these parameter values, monetary policy reacts strongly to in￿ation in the
active regime (®1 = 3:6). Since the passive regime is persistent (p22 = 0:9), it seems
likely that if the active regime is short-lived, the model will be indeterminate. This
conjecture is supported by applying DL’s necessary and su￿cient condition which
indicates that indeterminacy occurs if 0 < p11 · 0:57 since for these values of p11, at
least one of the generalized eigenvalues of (B;A) lies outside the unit circle.
The logic of the DL argument implies that if the active regime is persistent enough,
cross-regime spillovers may cause the equilibrium to be unique. The economic in-
tuition for this switch to determinacy is that agents in the passive regime take into
account the probability that monetary policy will become active. As DL argue persua-
sively, the more persistent is the active regime, the more likely will be the occurrence
of cross-regime spillovers working through expectations-formation e￿ects.
Equilibrium characteristics indeterminacy determinacy indeterminacy
p11 (Prob of active regime) (0; 0:57] [0:58; 0:86] [0:87; 1:0]
Table 2. Misleading spillovers implied by the DL condition. As the
active regime becomes progressively more persistent, the model moves
from being indeterminate to determinate but then back into the region
of indeterminacy.
Indeed, as the persistence of the active regime increases from the range 0 < p11 ·
0:57 to the range 0:58 · p11 · 0:86, the DL condition implies that cross-regime
spillovers take e￿ect and the equilibrium moves from being indeterminate to determi-
nate just as the logic of their argument suggests. Continuing to apply the same condi-
tion, however, one concludes that as the active regime becomes even more persistent
with p11 above 0.86, the equilibrium reverts to indeterminacy. Table 2 summarizes
these puzzling ￿ndings.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 8













Figure 1. A problematic implication of the DL condition: the new-
Keynesian model with ®1 = 3:6;®2 = 0:7;°1 = 0:3;°2 = 0:1;¯ =
0:99;¾ = 2:84, and · = 0:3. The shaded area is a ￿uniqueness equi-
librium￿ region implied by the DL’s necessary and su￿cient condition
for determinacy. As the active regime becomes progressively more per-
sistent, the model moves from being indeterminate to determinate for
some values of p22. For other values of p22, the model moves from the
indeterminate region to the determinate region but then back into the
region of indeterminacy.
Figure 1 plots the ￿determinacy￿ region implied by the DL condition for a range of
values of p11 and p22. Clearly, some of the results implied by this ￿gure are spurious
since it makes no sense for the model to move from indeterminacy to determinacy
and back to indeterminacy as the active regime increases in persistence. How does
one explain this puzzle? We show in Section IV that the DL condition is a necessary
but not a su￿cient condition for the NK model to be determinate.
IV. Sufficient Conditions for Indeterminacy
In this section we derive a su￿cient condition for indeterminacy for a class of
Markov-switching rational expectations models that includes the MSNK model as a
special case. We show that our condition is equivalent to ￿nding a solution to a certain
non-linear equation and we derive two useful corollaries to our main theorem. The
￿rst shows that the DL condition is necessary for determinacy. The second provides a
separate su￿cient condition for indeterminacy that can be checked in practice. Using
Corollary 2, one can easily construct counterexamples showing that the DL condition
is not su￿cient for determinacy. Proofs are collected in Appendices B-C.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 9
Consider models of the form
¡styt = Etyt+1 + ªstut (8)
where yt is an n-dimensional vector of endogenous random variables and ut is an
m-dimensional vector of exogenous shocks which are allowed to be serially correlated.
In particular, ut may take the vector autoregressive form ut = ½ut¡1 + "t where all
the eigenvalues of ½ are strictly less than one in absolute value and "t is a bounded
exogenous process independent of st satisfying Et¡1 ["t] = 0. The new-Keynesian
model, Eq (4), is a special case of Eq (8) where ¡st = H¡1Fst and ªst = H¡1.
Let the notation diag(Xi) denote a block-diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements
are X1;:::;Xh. We have the following key theorem.
Theorem 1. If there exist complex numbers c1;¢¢¢ ;ch with jcij · 1 for all i = 1;:::;h
and an nh-dimensional non-zero complex vector v such that
(diag (¡i) ¡ (diag (ci)P) ­ In)v = 0, (9)
then there exists multiple bounded solutions to Eq (8).
It is computationally feasible to check whether Eq (9) is satis￿ed by ￿nding ci’s
that solve the non-linear equation
det(diag (¡i) ¡ (diag (ci)P) ­ In) = 0 (10)
subject to the constraint that jcij · 1 for all i = 1;:::h. In the case of one regime
this reduces to an eigenvalue problem. In the case of two or more regimes it is a
polynomial that can be solved numerically, for example, by a grid search over the h
complex numbers fcigh
i=1. In the two-regime NK model, if there exists a solution where
both of the ci are inside the unit circle then our theorem guarantees the existence
of multiple bounded sunspot solutions to the MSNK model in both the active and
passive regimes.9
The following corollaries highlight two special cases of interest. The ￿rst shows
that the DL condition is a necessary condition for uniqueness and the second can
easily be used to construct examples to show that it is not su￿cient.






(P ­ In) has an eigenvalue greater than or equal to one in
absolute value, then there are multiple bounded solutions to Eq (8).
It might not be immediately obvious that the condition in this corollary is the same
as the DL condition when their condition is used to identify indeterminacy. But if
9One can show that for the case n = 1, Theorem 1 is both necessary and su￿cient for the
existence of multiple bounded solutions. If one restricts attention to non-negative values for the
scalars, ¡i, then DL’s condition for the Fisherian (one dimensional) model becomes a special case
of this Theorem.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 10
one appropriately reorders the variables and equations in their expanded system, Eq
(7), one will see that all the generalized eigenvalues of (B;A) lie on or outside the
unit circle if and only if the condition in Corollary 1 is satis￿ed.
Corollary 2. If there exists i 2 f1;:::;hg such that ¡i has an eigenvalue less than or
equal to pii in absolute value, then there are multiple bounded solutions to (8).
Corollary 2 implies that there are conditions based only on the parameters of a
single regime that imply indeterminacy in every regime. This result is new. In
Section VI, we give a number of parameterized examples of the MSNK model, based
on this corollary, in which we show that if the in￿ation dove is su￿ciently passive
there may be no action that can be taken by the in￿ation hawk that will restore
determinacy even in the active regime.
V. Indeterminacy in an Active Regime
In this section we use Theorem 1 to construct indeterminate solutions for both
active and passive regimes in the NK model. We then provide a quantitative example
using calibrated parameter values based on the estimates of Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004). This example illustrates one of the key messages of this paper. Multiple
self-ful￿lling paths may spill over to the active regime even if the passive regime is
relatively short-lived. Moreover, the parameter values for which this phenomenon
occurs are well within the con￿dence bounds for recent parameter estimates based on
U.S. data.
It is widely believed that U.S. monetary policy in the post-1982 period has been
active enough to ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium within the framework of the
NK model. In the regime-switching environment studied by DL, however, there exists
a probability that policy will revert to the passive regime. If the equilibrium is not
unique, does indeterminacy occur only in the passive regime so that the equilibrium
remains unique once an in￿ation hawk takes o￿ce? This question is important be-
cause a positive answer implies that as long as the in￿ation hawk is in o￿ce, the
propagation of shocks will not be a￿ected by indeterminacy in the passive regime.
Let bygones be bygones, so to speak.10 But if the answer to the question is negative,
a passive monetary policy is more damaging and prevalent than had previously been
thought because there may be multiple self-ful￿lling paths for in￿ation even when an
in￿ation hawk is appointed to run the central bank.
V.1. Multiple bounded equilibria. To maintain analytical clarity, we assume that
the vector ut (of demand and supply shocks) follows an i.i.d. process. This assumption
does not alter conditions under which the equilibrium may or may not be unique.
10Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006a) give an example of this sort in the context of a very simple
model.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 11
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This solution exhibits no dynamics. If the su￿ciency condition of Theorem 1 is satis-
￿ed, the solution is not unique and there are other bounded equilibria in which both
in￿ation and output, represented by yt, are serially dependent. Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) give an analytical form for serially-dependent sunspot equilibria for the basic
NK model with no regime switching. We show, below, how to ￿nd a similar represen-
tation of sunspot equilibria for the MSNK model. In these equilibria, in￿ation and
output are serially dependent even when the fundamental shocks are i.i.d.
To construct an indeterminate solution in the Markov-switching case let c1, c2 and
v0 = [v0
1;v0
2] satisfy Eq (9) of Theorem 1. For this example, the vectors v1 and v2 are
two-dimensional and since Eq (9) is satis￿ed, there exist multiple bounded solutions
to the NK model, Eq (4), given by the expression,











wt¡1 + vst (Mut + »t): (13)
We have represented the solution as the sum of the fundamental solution (which is the
component Gstut) and a sunspot solution represented by wt. The sunspot solution is
autocorrelated and is driven by a non-fundamental sunspot shock, which is the term
»t, and a fundamental sunspot shock, which is the component Mut where M is an
arbitrary 1 £ 2 row matrix. The non-fundamental shock, »t, is any one-dimensional
bounded stochastic process with zero mean that is independent of both ut and st.11
The terms cst and vst are analogous to eigenvalues and eigenvectors in a model with no
regime switching. Since the cst are all inside the unit circle, the sequence fwtg remains
bounded and the sunspot shocks die out asymptotically, just as in the one-regime case
studied by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004).
It is straightforward to verify that Eq (12) is a solution. Since the stochastic











11If vst¡1 = 0, then the coe￿cient of wt¡1 is taken to be zero and if any of the ci are equal to one
in absolute value, then M and »t should be taken to be zero in order to guarantee boundedness. If
any of the ci or vi are complex, then the solution given by Eq (12) will be complex, but either the
real or the imaginary component of wt can be used to construct real solutions.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 12
where
Etvst+1 = pst1v1 + pst2v2:
Since Gst = ¡¡1
st ªst, one can see from Eqs (8) and (12) that
Etyt+1 = ¡styt ¡ ªstut = ¡stwt:









wt = 0: (14)
As wt is proportional to vst, Eq (14) needs to be veri￿ed only for wt = vst. Because ci
and vi are chosen to satisfy Eq (9), Eq (14) will also hold. Therefore, we can directly
verify Eq (14) for a speci￿c example, such as the one presented in the next subsection.
V.2. A Quantitative Example. This section demonstrates the existence of sunspot
solutions to the NK model when parameters are calibrated to the values estimated
by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Although these authors did not explicitly account
for the probabilities of regime change in their empirical work, taking account of these
probabilities in the NK model is a natural extension of their work. Our point is
to show that the possibility that the set of regimes may be indeterminate is not
outside of the bounds of plausibility and for this purpose the estimated values of
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) seem a good place to start.
Lubik and Schorfheide estimate a constant-parameter version of the NK model for
the two subsamples: 1960:I-1979:II and 1982:I-1997:IV. For our calibrated example
we chose policy parameters in each regime equal to their estimates and we set private-
sector parameters equal to the means of their estimates for individual regimes. These
values are reported in columns 1 through 7 of Table 3. Notice that in contrast to
Table 1, Regime 1 is passive, in line with historical precedence (McChesney-Martin-
Burns-Miller came before Volker-Greenspan-Bernanke).
Private Sector Regime 1 Regime 2 Trans. Pr.
¯ ¾ · ®1 °1 ®2 °2 p11 p22
0.9949 1.6550 0.6750 0.7700 0.1700 2.1900 0.3000 0.8577 0.9900
Table 3. Parameter Values Calibrated to Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004)’s Estimates
Columns 8 and 9 of this table report our calibrated transition probabilities. Given
that rational agents experienced passive monetary policy in the past, they may still
fear, under the Volker-Greenspan-Bernanke regime, that a future policymaker may
deviate from its active stance. Some deviations may simply re￿ect the reality that the
policymaker has a mandate to address other economic concerns such as recessions orMARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 13
￿nancial crises. Moreover, since Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board is a political
appointee, there is always a probability that an in￿ation dove may be appointed to
run the Fed. To take account of these possibilities we chose transition probabilities
as p11 = 0:8577 and p22 = 0:99.
The choice of p11 implies that agents perceive a 14% chance of returning to an active
regime in any quarter. This choice implies an expected duration for the passive regime
of only seven quarters. In contrast, the expected duration of the active regime (p11 =
0:99) is twenty ￿ve years. These numbers imply that, in the ergodic distribution, the
economy will spend less than 7% of the time in the hands of the in￿ation dove. These
numbers do not seem unreasonable given historical experience.
Taking our calibrated parameterization, we solve Eq (10) and we ￿nd numbers
jc1j < 1 and jc2j < 1 such that
det(diag (¡i) ¡ (diag (ci)P) ­ In)















Substituting these values into Eq (13) and using Eq (12), we ￿nd persistent sunspot
solutions that remain bounded in both active and passive regimes.12 This example
highlights a key ￿nding of our work. Even though a passive regime may be short-lived
and the agents’ belief in switching to this regime is low, the possibility that a passive
policy may be adopted at times makes it di￿cult for an active policy to eliminate the
destabilizing e￿ects of self-ful￿lling expectations.
VI. Further Implications of Cross-Regime Spillovers
In this section, we discuss a number of examples of cross-regime spillovers in the
MSNK model. The purpose is two-fold. One is to show practical problems of using
Corollary 1 as a necessary and su￿cient condition for identifying indeterminacy (and
hence also for identifying determinacy), as was proposed in the existing literature
(Davig and Leeper, 2005, 2006b). The other is to draw out a disturbing implication
12It is straightforward to verify that the resulting expression obtained by substituting these values
into Eqs (12) and (13) satis￿es Eq (8) as required.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 14
of Corollary 2. Consider the situation where there is a passive regime that satis￿ed
Corollary 2 but the parameter values are such that Corollary 1 is violated. If one uses
Corollary 1 as though it were a necessary and su￿cient condition for indeterminacy,
one may wrongly conclude that an in￿ation hawk can make the policy active enough
to ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium. A correct conclusion is: there are no possible
values for the parameters of the interest rate and output-gap response coe￿cients of
the Taylor rule in the active regime that can restore determinacy.
We begin by revisiting the example considered in Section III.2 and we demonstrate
that this example satis￿es the conditions of Corollary 2. Recall that in this example,
regime 1 is active and regime 2 is passive. Substituting the parameter values from
Table 1 into F2 and H into Eq (4) and computing ¡2 = H¡1F2, one can verify that
¡2 has an eigenvalue less than p22 = 0:9. By Corollary 2, the equilibria of the model
are indeterminate regardless of the values of p11 and bounded sunspot solutions can
be computed from Eq (12). Table 4 summarizes the correct equilibrium properties
of this model for di￿erent values of p11. This result explains the puzzling results
displayed in Table 2, which arise from using DL’s incorrect su￿ciency condition for
uniqueness.
Equilibrium characteristics indeterminacy indeterminacy indeterminacy
p11 (Prob of active regime) (0; 0:57] [0:58; 0:86] [0:87; 1:0]
Table 4. Correct equilibrium characteristics of the example in Section
III.2 (according to Corollary 2).
When 0:58 · p11 · 0:86, the model has multiple bounded equilibria in contrast
to the incorrect results reported in Table 2. Figure 2 plots p11 against p22 holding
other parameter values ￿xed. The union of the dark-shaded and light-shaded areas
indicates an indeterminacy region. The light-shaded area is determined by Corollary
1 of Theorem 1. The dark-shaded area, determined by Corollary 2, is incorrectly
identi￿ed as a ￿uniqueness￿ region by the DL condition stated in Claim 1.
Figure 3 displays an indeterminate region corresponding to di￿erent values of ®1
and ®2 when p11 = 0:8 and p22 = 0:9. The values of the other parameters are the
same as in Table 1. As long as ®1 > 1, the model would be determinate in regime
1 if st = 1 were an absorbing regime. Similarly, for 0 < ®2 < 1 the model would be
indeterminate if st = 2 were absorbing. The union of dark-shaded and light-shaded
areas (computed using Corollaries 1 and 2) identi￿es a region of indeterminacy for
the MSNK model. The dark-shaded area represents the indeterminate region missed
by using Corollary 1. In this region monetary policy is su￿ciently passive (®2 is less
than 0.75), that there is no unique solution to the new-Keynesian model no matter
how active is policy in the active regime.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 15













Figure 2. Equilibrium characteristics: the new-Keynesian model with
®1 = 3:6;®2 = 0:7;°1 = 0:3;°2 = 0:1;¯ = 0:99;¾ = 2:84, and · = 0:3.
The union of the dark and light shaded areas is an indeterminacy region
according to Corollaries 1 and 2. The dark-shaded area is incorrectly
regarded as a ￿uniqueness￿ region by the DL condition.
















Figure 3. Equilibrium characteristics: the new-Keynesian model with
°1 = 0:3;°2 = 0:1;¯ = 0:99;¾ = 2:84;· = 0:3;p11 = 0:8, and p22 = 0:9.
The union of the dark and light shaded areas is an indeterminacy region
according to Corollaries 1 and 2. The dark-shaded area represents the
di￿erence between Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
Figure 4 corresponds to the upper-right panel of Figure 2 in Davig and Leeper
(2005, 2006b). It plots ®1 against ®2 when °1 = 0;°2 = 0;¯ = 0:99;¾ = 1:0,MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 16
· = 0:17, p11 = 0:8, and p22 = 0:95. If one uses Corollary 1 as though it were a neces-
sary and su￿cient condition, the dark-shaded area will be regarded as a uniqueness
region and thus the in￿ation hawk in the active regime could respond to in￿ation
strongly enough (by increasing the value of ®1) to ensure that both regimes are de-
terminate. This conclusion is incorrect since Corollary 2 establishes that there exist
multiple bounded equilibria at every point in this dark-shaded area. If researchers
were to use Corollary 1 to test for indeterminacy, using methods similar to those
of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), they would wrongly conclude that active monetary
policy in the Volker-Greenspan era had ensured a unique equilibrium not only in the
post-1982 period but also before 1980.














Figure 4. Equilibrium characteristics: the new-Keynesian model with
°1 = 0;°2 = 0;¯ = 0:99;¾ = 1:0;· = 0:17;p11 = 0:8, and p22 = 0:95 (an
example of DL’s Figure 2). The union of the dark and light shaded areas
is an indeterminacy region according to Corollaries 1 and 2. The dark-
shaded area represents the di￿erence between Corollary 1 and Corollary
2.
Corollaries 1 and 2 are straightforward to implement. Theorem 1 identi￿es an
indeterminacy region that is larger than that identi￿ed by its two corollaries. To see
whether this di￿erence matters in practice, Figure 5 replicates the upper-right panel
of Figure 2 from Davig and Leeper (2005, 2006b). This ￿gures plots ®1 against ®2
when °1 = 0;°2 = 0;¯ = 0:99;¾ = 1:0, · = 0:17, p11 = 0:95, and p22 = 0:8. The
light-shaded area is identi￿ed by Corollary 1. For the most part, the area identi￿ed
by Corollary 2 overlaps with the light-shaded area (and thus we do not plot it). The
dark-shaded area marks the di￿erence between Theorem 1 and its corollaries.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 17












Figure 5. Equilibrium characteristics: the new-Keynesian model with
°1 = 0;°2 = 0;¯ = 0:99;¾ = 1:0;· = 0:17;p11 = 0:95, and p22 = 0:8
(an example of DL’s Figure 2). The union of the dark and light shaded
areas is an indeterminacy region according to Theorem 1. The dark-
shaded area marks the di￿erence between Theorem 1 and its corollaries.
VII. Conclusion
The Taylor rule is widely regarded as an e￿ective way to describe the historical con-
duct of monetary policy although the parameters of the rule have changed over time as
documented by Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and
Boivin and Giannoni (2006). These changes are likely to be embedded in the public’s
perception that future monetary policy may change for better or worse (Goodfriend,
1993; Sargent, 1999; Mishkin, 2004). What are the equilibrium consequences if the
public believes that there is a probability that monetary policy will at times abandon
its hawkish stance on in￿ation in order to accommodate other economic concerns?
This question is at the heart of our paper.
We have studied a version of the new-Keynesian model where parameters of the
Taylor rule change over time according to a Markov-switching process. In this regime-
switching environment, rational agents form expectations by explicitly taking into
account the probability of future policy changes between active and passive regimes.
This environment is di￿erent from the basic new-Keynesian model with no regime
switching and, since agents are forward looking, it di￿ers substantially from backward-
looking Markov-switching models studied by Sims and Zha (2006). New approaches
are required.
This paper has made four contributions to the study of NK models with endoge-
nous regimes. First, we have provided a wide class of su￿cient conditions for non-
uniqueness of the bounded equilibrium. Second, we have proved that Davig and LeeperMARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 18
(2005, 2006b)’s condition for uniqueness is necessary but not su￿cient and when used
for identifying indeterminacy, is a special case of our general su￿cient condition.
Third, we have showed that a passive policy may spillover into an active regime and
we have used existing estimates of policy for pre-1980 and post-1982 regimes to show
that this phenomenon cannot be ruled out as descriptive of U.S. data. Finally, we
have showed that there may exist regimes that are so passive that equilibria will be
indeterminate in all regimes no matter what policy is followed by an active policy
maker.
A challenging task for future research is to derive a necessary and su￿cient con-
dition under which there is a unique bounded equilibrium for the Markov switching
new-Keynesian model. The techniques used to construct our examples are easy to
implement and will, we hope, point the way to researchers who might wish to take
up this challenge. Solving this problem is a necessary step if a researcher wished to
follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) by constructing a test for indeterminacy in the
U.S. economy that takes account of regime switches.
Appendix A. Conditioning
The results obtained in this paper rely heavily on the concept of conditioning in
probability theory. Understanding this concept is essential to knowing where DL go
wrong with their necessary and su￿cient condition for determinacy in the NK model.
The error occurs when they introduce the four new random variables ¼1t, ¼2t, x1t,
and x2t and use Eqs (5) and (6), reproduced below as Eqs (A1) and (A2),
Et¼t+1 = pst1Et¼1t+1 + pst2Et¼2t+1; (A1)
Etxt+1 = pst1Etx1t+1 + pst2Etx2t+1; (A2)
to obtain the expanded linear system (7). The rules of conditioning, however, imply
the following conditional relationships
Et¼t+1 = pst1Et [¼t+1jst+1 = 1] + pst2Et [¼t+2jst+1 = 2]; (A3)
Etxt+1 = pst1Et [xt+1jst+1 = 1] + pst2Et [xt+2jst+1 = 2]: (A4)
Although ¼i;t+1 = ¼t+1 and xi;t+1 = xt+1 when st+1 = i, it does not follow that
Et¼i;t+1 = Et [¼t+1 jst+1 = i] and Etxi;t+1 = Et [xt+1 jst+1 = i] for i = 1;2. The dy-
namics of ¼i;t+1 and xi;t+1 when st+1 6= i a￿ect the value of the Et [¢] operator. In
order for (A1) and (A2) to hold, there must be additional hidden restrictions on the
dynamics of ¼i;t+1 and xi;t+1 when st+1 6= i. The linear system represented by (7) is
not the same as the original non-linear model (4). Although these two systems share
some solutions in common, there may exist bounded solutions to the original model
that are not solutions to the expanded linear system, as shown by the results in our
paper.MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 19
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 1
Because any bounded solution yt+1 of (8) can be written as
yt+1 = ^ yt+1 + ~ yt+1
where ^ yt+1 is any particular bounded solution of Eq (8) and ~ yt+1 is a bounded solution
of
Et [yt+1] = ¡styt, (A5)
Eq (8) has multiple bounded solutions if and only if Eq (A5) has a non-zero bounded
solution, assuming a solution of Eq (8) exists. Since we are interested in the existence
of multiple bounded solutions, we will operate under the assumption that there exists
at least one bounded solution of Eq (8). This is a rather mild assumption. For
instance, Eq (8) will have a solution of the form yt = Gstut if and only if there is
nh £ m matrix G such that
diag (¡i)G = (P ­ In)G½ + ª
where ª0 = [ª1 ¢¢¢ªh].
Theorem 1 follows from the following more general theorem. While we believe
that this theorem comes close to giving the full region on which there are multiple
solutions, it is not practical to implement.
Theorem 2. Let V1;¢¢¢ ;Vh be linear subspaces of Cn with at least one of the Vi
non-zero and let m1;¢¢¢ ;mh be positive real numbers. If there exist n £ n complex
matrices ¤i;j such that









pi;j¤j;ivi for vi 2 Vi (A8)
then there exists multiple bounded solutions of Eq (A5).
Before proceeding with the proof of the theorem, we relate the conditions in this
proposition to the constant parameter case. Consider the constant parameter analog
of Eq (8),
Et [yt+1] = ¡yt ¡ ªut: (A9)
A bounded solution of Eq (A9) can be characterized by a linear subspace, often re-
ferred to as the stable matnifold, and a linear reduced form relation that describes the
evolution of the solution. The linear subspaces Vi play the role of the stable manifold
and the matrices ¤i;j play the role of the reduced form coe￿cients. Equation (A6)
ensures that the solutions stays on the stable manifold and Equation (A8) ensuresMARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 20
that we indeed have a solution as long as we are on the stable manifold. Equation
(A7) guarantees that the solution is bounded. One should note that Eq (A7) is stated
in terms of a matrix norm, while the more usual conditions for the stable manifold
are in terms of eigenvalues. While these conditions are related, they are not the same.
Proof. We inductively construct a non-zero bounded solution of Eq (A5). For 1 ·
i · h, choose vi 2 Vi so that at least one of the vi is non-zero. Let y1 = vs1 and






























While we have constructed a non-zero bounded solution, it could be a complex. How-
ever, in this case, both the real and imaginary components will be bounded solutions
of Eq (A5) and at least one will be non-zero. ¤
Theorem 1 is essentially Theorem 2 applied to the case in which each of the Vi are
one-dimensional. We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose that there exists v and ci as in the Theorem 1 and let vi be the ith






j vj 6= 0
0 vj = 0
and mi =
(
kvik vi 6= 0
1 vi = 0
,
where vH






mj vj 6= 0
0 vj = 0
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In either case, k¤i;jk ·
mi
mj so condition (A7) holds. Finally, note that Eq (9) implies
¡ivi = (e
0
i ­ In)diag (¡i)v
= (e
0





















where ei is the ith column of the h£h identity matrix. So condition (A8) holds. ¤
Appendix C. Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2
























Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 1 by taking ci = 1=¸ and v = u. ¤








u j = i











An easy calculation shows that
(diag (¡i) ¡ (diag (ci) ­ In)(P ­ In))v = 0,
and so the second corollary follows from Theorem 1. ¤MARKOV-SWITCHING NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 22
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